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Introduction 
  
In animal rights there has been a proliferation of material discussing the ethical 
treatment of agricultural animals and animals used in research.  The topic of this paper 
and will contain an assessment of a different qualification of animals that has been paid 
little attention in most academic traditions; this is vermin. Vermin is a colloquial word 
employed to discern an animal that is unwanted.  Vermin is an interesting topic as oppose 
to ‘invasive species’ or ‘maligned species’, which have been paid considerable attention, 
because those titles do not necessarily connote the same as ‘vermin’.  There are two main 
objectives to this paper: the first is an epistemic concern – how do we know what is a 
vermin.  This, of course, has a metaphysical component: do vermin have an ontological 
status aside from how humans categorize them? The second objective is mainly ethical – 
given the criteria of vermin and how we treat them, how ought we treat them?  
The first objective of this paper is to define what qualifies as vermin.  The entails 
drawing distinctions between invasive species other terms and vermin, as well as 
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mapping out the characteristics that make an animal qualify as vermin.  Eventually it will 
be shown that the category of vermin is conventional in society, which, in itself, has 
implications that will be discussed in the second objective.  It is my hope that in 
formulating criteria for vermin, it might be possible to distinguish between different types 
of vermin, potentially leading to different methods for treating them. In deciphering 
criteria we will be forced to look at the causes of vermin, and since vermin will be shown 
to be a convention of society/human civilization, that is we have literally created the title 
but we enable some animals to live in ways that make them candidates for being vermin, 
which implies that ‘vermin’ do not have ‘natural’ ontological status, we are left with the 
question: do we have responsibility to them?  This question leads to the second objective 
of this paper: a discussion on the moral concerns surrounding vermin and the potential 
implications.   
There are many issues that arise from the first objective.  Some of them will be 
discussed and other issues will be relegated to a lesser status and, consequently, they will 
only be outlined or mentioned, but could be discussed with further research.  Here is a 
preliminary listing of the different ethical questions.  First, given that there is a growing 
social concern for animal rights, why is it that the animals we see as vermin have not 
been extended the same rights?  Is there a logical or practical basis for this, or is it simply 
an aesthetic dislike?  Do we have the responsibility of treating them as something more 
than vermin if they are a creation/by-product of our society?  Second, the criteria and 
treatment of vermin, in some cases, rely upon an idea of ecological soundness, which 
leads to the question: can concerns for animal rights lead us to a form of environmental 
ethics, which has in some cases relied upon a type mysticism or an articulated but un-
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argued belief that living things, in virtue of living, have intrinsic value? Third, if there are 
discernable criteria for vermin, can we logically extend our criteria to include other 
animals that are not normally considered vermin, namely ethnic groups or lifestyles of 
different humans?  This relies upon the idea that if we can logically extend principles 
(like rights) to animals, contrarily, we must be able to extend those same principles that 
we use for animals to humans.  Herein, lies a problem: the logical extension or movement 
is in someway inappropriate, the treatment of some animals that we categorize as vermin, 
or we ought to treat some humans as we treat vermin.  Ultimately, I will conclude that 
our ethical beliefs coupled with the dangers and ineffective methods of extermination 
mandate that we ought to employ alternative methods for limiting populations of vermin 
and all potentially hazardous animals.  
  
Discerning Vermin 
  
Vermin and others 
  
            Often we employ the word vermin to animals that we are not fond of, and, in 
some cases, these words and ways of acting towards those animals is rationalized.  In 
cities or more populated areas vermin is employed to animals that pose certain health 
concerns, but in rural areas were agriculture is the predominant life-style vermin is used 
in conjunction with animals that are destructive to the land or the ecological system. 
 Here there are already two different types of vermin, health vermin and destructive 
vermin, but before we can investigate these different types a comparative analysis of 
labels that are applied to animals will help in establishing the importance and difference 
of vermin.   
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            Philosophical consideration has been targeted namely at invasive species, and 
most of the this has been generated out of ecological concern.  The importance of this 
work should not be underestimated for I feel that the natural habitats are important to 
maintain and this can lead to a concern for environmental ethics, but our project is 
different.  When ecologists, philosophers, and others discuss invasive species they 
usually mean invasive alien species – that is, species that are not native to the ecological 
system they are inhabiting and probably destroying.  Yvonne Baskin accurately describes 
some problems with invasive alien species: “these invaders dominate, disrupt, out 
compete, prey on, hybridize with, or spread disease among native species or alter the 
terms of life in the community of changing the soil, the available light or water, the 
frequency of fire, or even the structure of the landscape.” (Ibid., 3)  These invasive alien 
species are problematical for ecological equilibrium (if we are willing to assume that 
equilibrium of a biotic community is value-laden, which is an issue that cannot be dealt 
with here, but will be assumed on the basis that many people do value the natural 
environment to some degree) and vermin, who can be classified as invasive species, are 
too.  However, invasive species must be an assemblage of animals that are not native and 
are, in some way, destructive/disruptive to the ecological equilibrium. Additionally, 
vermin is a term used with animals and usually only small animals, although as we will 
see there are exceptions, while invasive alien species connotes plants as well as animals.   
            While there are differences between invasive species and vermin there are also 
similarities.  Most people are familiar with the invasive species problems that Australia 
faced in the 19th century.  The most famous of which is probably the rabbit problem.  
Rabbits came to Australia as cargo on ships of convicts and settlers for food from the 
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1770’s through the early 1800’s.  While rabbits, in this situation, are invasive species, 
they also fit the criteria of vermin: small animals, destructive, hazardous, over-populated, 
etc.  The lesser-known Madagascar rubbervines in Queensland, while similar in many 
regards, do not qualify as vermin because they are plants. An in depth discussion on the 
specific problems associated with the invasive species in Australia can be found in the 
book They All Ran Wild by Eric Rolls, although he calls invasive species and vermin 
‘pests’.   
            Pest is another term occasionally employed as an informal synonym with vermin, 
but pest does not necessarily suggest the dangerous or destructive nature that vermin 
does.  A pest is similar to a varmint, but a pest can be something that is merely annoying.  
However, both pests and vermin usually imply animals and insects.  While there may be 
interesting philosophical problems or issues with insects and some may posit that insects 
also deserve moral consideration, it is not a position that will be entertained in this essay. 
For the sake of this discussion when vermin is used it will only refer to the animal 
division of pest/vermin.  
            Here vermin are different from invasive species and pests.  In some cases, vermin 
are pests and/or invasive species, but this paper is chiefly concerned with the cases of 
animals that we consider vermin, some of which are not necessarily alien.  A large 
portion of this paper focus on rats because many people think of rats as vermin, although 
some think of rats as pets or friends.  Rats provide an interesting case because they are 
seen as a parasitic animal that lives on the outskirts and feeds on the waste of human 
society – ought we consider them invasive species or alien?  We can formulate this 
question as ‘can we think of sewers as natural ecosystems?’  Ultimately, we will 
Between the Species VI August 2006 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 6
conclude that sewers are non-natural and thus we cannot consider vermin invasive.  
Similarly, prairie dogs, which live in their natural habitat, are considered vermin.  The 
first problem that arises is how we define what is natural.  Some like to think that there 
cannot be anything that is non-natural.  The argument is as follows.  If animals are 
natural, and humans are animals, then humans are natural.  Or if animals cannot produce 
something non-natural, and humans are animals, then humans cannot produce something 
non-natural.  Basically, this is a holistic argument that relies on the notion that something 
natural cannot do anything that is non-natural – or that something synthetic cannot be 
constructed from something organic.  There are many objections: one might deny the first 
or second premise in the first syllogism: one might argue that not all animals are natural 
(genetic engineering, cloning, breeding, etc.) or that humans, because of our cognitive 
capacities, are different from animals, which are both fairly tenuous arguments. 
Additionally, one might object that the term natural is still not defined and that the terms 
‘natural’, ‘organic’, and ‘synthetic’ are ‘shifty terms’.  It suffices to say that there are 
many conceptual issues with what is or can be considered natural that cannot be fully 
explicated here.  
One might also examine, how one can say that an animal is alien: if all animals 
are part of the earth, how could one animal be alien to a particular part?  I believe that 
alien is used, as per invasive species, in a more refined sense. That is, an alien species is 
one that would not have originated without outside help – e.g. humans bringing rabbits to 
Australia. Again, ‘outside help’ is defined vaguely here.  Without positing that there is 
some sort of divine plan or intervention (i.e. for understanding ‘outside’), and without 
firmly taking a stance on what is natural and what is not, we cannot conclusively state 
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that humans bringing rabbits to Australia is unnatural or that rabbits are alien. Given 
these conceptual problems, I believe it is the case that rabbits are, in fact, alien to 
Australia.  Imagine a world in which humans never lived and there were never any 
intelligent beings or intelligent-raft-creatures able to transfer rabbits from Europe to 
Australia: would there ever have been a rabbit over-population problem in Australia?  
No.  This is what is meant by ‘alien’ in discussing invasive species.  Additionally, we use 
‘invasive alien species’ for a group of animals that necessarily disrupt the ecological 
equilibrium/stability or bring some harm to the ecosystem that it would not face in the 
same way if the alien species had not been introduced.  Vermin can be invasive species, 
but vermin are not necessarily invasive species or invasive species are not necessarily 
vermin given how we have broadened the scope of vermin to include animals that are 
destructive in their natural habitat.  Additionally, vermin are not necessarily invasive 
species because, as we will see later, they have a more intimate relationship with humans 
than invasive species.  
In conclusion, vermin are not plants, they are not insects, and they are not 
necessarily alien in the same sense that invasive species are.  At this point one might 
object that vermin is a vague colloquial term and that it is still being used vaguely here, 
with a few limitations generated for this essay, and vermin is not yet as defined as 
invasive species.  This objection is exactly right.  Although, I am limiting the ways in 
which I speak of vermin, I hope to show that vermin, as a colloquial word, is vague.  
Unlike ‘invasive alien species’ which clearly defines and demarcates a specific 
problematic group of animals, ‘vermin’ is not as articulated. Vermin is a nebulously 
defined group (of animals (in this case)), lending it an air of equivocation.  The problem 
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is that we have not yet settled the issue of what makes an animal a vermin, only what the 
difference is between invasive species and vermin and pests and vermin, in the hope of 
showing differences and perhaps elucidating a problem.  I am not suggesting that vermin 
are dramatically different from invasive species and pests, but unlike invasive alien 
species, vermin is a bit harder to define.  We turn to that problem now.  
  
Defining Vermin 
  
There are two types of vermin – health risk vermin (HV) and destructive vermin 
(DV).  Because our discussion in the last section mentioned invasive species, which are 
similar in many ways to DV, we will start with that classification and then move to HV.  
Invasive species are species that are alien to the natural ecosystem that in some 
way jeopardize ecological equilibrium/stability, as discussed above. The rabbits of 
Australia fit the criteria of vermin because they were destructive animals, thus fulfilling 
the criteria for vermin.  This seems to show one way of conceptualizing DV, but there is 
another way.  For example, in many of the mountain states of America prairie dogs pose 
an enormous threat.  Prairie dogs burrow underground riddling a field with holes 
providing a dangerous and potentially costly medical care for horses and annoyance for 
contractors. Because of their problematic nature to horses and development they are seen 
as DV.  But because of the annoying nature of prairie dog holes and their overwhelming 
abundance, which does not impact many people, they are seen by some as vermin.  Most 
people, however, see prairie dogs as cute, but it is my hope to show that when they 
become labeled as vermin people feed justified in exterminating them.  It is often the case 
that prairie dogs are not invasive species because they are natural inhabitants of the 
ecosystem, yet we categorize them as DV and attempt to eradicate them in many ways 
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because they can be tremendously dangerous to horses, concrete foundations, and 
annoying to developers. 
There is another problem with prairie dogs.  Although they live in their ‘natural 
habitat’ (i.e. they were not transplanted by humans to the mountain states, on to horse 
farms, and/or lots being surveyed for strip malls), humans have altered their natural 
habitat by eliminating many of their natural predators, namely coyotes.  In a short report 
entitled “Population Status and Trend of Selected Small Game, Furbearers and Varmints 
in Colorado”, Harvey Donoho focuses on the depletion of small game.  Donoho’s study, 
published in 1979, is far from conclusive, but foreshadows the coyote population’s 
demise: “If the population maintains itself at the 1979 level, it should approximate the 
1983 population objective.  The current harvest level is far below the 1983 objective.  
Unfortunately, data are not available over a sufficiently long period to estimate long term 
trend patters or what might be considered as normal populations fluctuations.” (Ibid., 56)  
If the 1979 harvest is far below the 1983 objective, there would need to be a great 
population boost to maintain the population objective for 1983, so there exists a tension 
between the first and second sentences of this quote.  This quote seems inconclusive, but 
he does note that at that in 1979 the coyote population was less than it probably should be 
for the year 1983.  Furthermore, if we factor in human population growth in Colorado 
from 1985 to 2000, which has doubled, leading to urban sprawl, and thus the elimination 
of coyotes from many native areas where prairie dogs are now over populated, we clearly 
see that the coyote population has been severely diminished.  (Note: this argument relies 
on the abundance of prairie dogs and the absence of coyotes to prove that coyotes have 
diminished, which could be considered begging the question.  However, it seems to me 
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that this is, in fact, what has happened.) The lack of coyotes is problematic because if 
there are not as many natural predators, then there will potentially be too many survivors 
and this is the case for prairie dogs.  By eliminating the prairie dogs natural predators, 
they have been able to breed at extraordinary rates, thus becoming a hazard not only to 
horses and contractors but also to their natural ecosystem.  This concern furthers the 
notion that prairie dogs are vermin, however it is no fault of their own – they are doing 
what it is prairie dogs have always done, but they are no longer constrained by predation.  
To combat the over-population of prairie dogs many have taken to killing them in 
anyway that is most efficient (cost effective): digging up their burrows, blocking their 
burrows to suffocate them and starve them, hunting, smoking-out, among others.  
However, this approach is faulty: it attempts to assuage the symptoms without heeding 
the disease.  The disease in this case is the unbalanced ecosystem caused by the lack of 
predation on prairie dogs.  The symptom is too many prairie dogs.  If we want to limit the 
prairie dog population, we can attempt to eradicate them, but chances are they will be 
back.  Or we can re-introduce predators that would naturally feed on prairie dogs in an 
attempt to reestablish an ecological equilibrium.  This second option has it own problems: 
it might be hard to identify what the ‘natural ecosystem’ was, as there may not be any 
record of it, as Donoho intimates; it might endanger humans if predators are introduced to 
a place where prairie dogs are a problem and it is in close proximity to human 
establishments; the predators may not be able to populate the area because of human 
establishments, etc.  While there are problems with the second option – re-introducing 
predators to naturally reduce vermin populations – it is probably the most ethical option if 
we postulate that all animals, even those that we find annoying, problematic, and ugly, 
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have a telos.  The issue of a telos will be discussed in detail in the section entitled 
“Including Vermin” in the second objective.  
Another type of DV is vermin who are destructive to human enterprises, not 
ecological stability as mentioned above.  To fully elucidate what is meant by DV that are 
destructive to human enterprise, we’ll turn to deer and then rats.  These examples will 
show how an animal can be destructive in a ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ sense and will 
segue to our discussion of HV. 
Prairie dogs are destructive to the ecological stability of an ecosystem because 
they are over populating.  In the mid-west, prairie dogs are not a problem, but deer over-
population is harmful for ecological and economic reasons.  Deer have overpopulated 
many areas and our solution is to have an annual hunting season, which helps to limit 
their expansion.  Bill Adler in his book, Outwitting Critters, argues that hunting is not 
effective to controlling the deer population, which is also used as a rationalization against 
some ethical concerns: “hunting has little effect on population size; it neither stabilizes 
nor reduces the population…no matter how many hunters there are, it would take an 
unmitigated act of carnage to significantly reduce the deer population.” (Ibid., 127) Deer 
have become a problem and will continue to be so because expansion of suburbia into 
what was ‘deer territory’ (land that deer inhabited prior to suburban expansion), the 
decrease or total elimination of predators has enabled unfettered population growth, and 
the attractive habitat and sources of food humans cultivate.  As a child who grew up in 
the mid-west, I used to see deer occasionally on farms or near highways, but mostly I saw 
deer on the shoulders of streets: bloody and bloated, killed by a driver who wasn’t 
expecting a deer to be traversing the road. Occasionally, I would hear about how deer 
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would find a neighbor’s garden and eat anything green. Now when I visit the mid-west, 
deer are ubiquitous: they still lay on roadsides, but they’re also in my parent’s back yard, 
or walking across the street, or being chased by the neighbor’s dog.  In the places that 
used to be farmland now stand commercially developed subdivisions.  Simply stated, the 
deer have nowhere else to go other than from subdivision to subdivision.  Deer ‘over 
population’ is a problem that humans have caused.  In some areas the over population of 
deer, the lack of predators (once again, coyotes), the forced/constrained habitation of deer 
populations, and the abundance of grains has caused thousands of dollars in damage to 
cars (people who have hit deer), threaten the ecological diversity in wild-life preserves 
(although, one should not blame the depletion of ecological diversity solely upon the 
deer’s appetites), and have a considerable amount of damage on crops.  “The 
Pennsylvania Farmer’s Association claims 36.4 million dollars’ worth of damage by deer 
each year.” (Ibid., 125)  Most suburbanites, myself being one of them, do not 
traditionally think of deer as vermin; however if we look at the damage they cause and 
our more contemporaneous attitudes toward them, they fit our criteria.  Like the prairie 
dogs in the western states, if we postulate that they have a telos (unlike prairie dogs, 
many people are enthralled by the majestic beauty of deer, which probably elicits some 
sort of sympathy for not simply killing, thus adding to our concern) then there are ethical 
issues in how we ought to limit the deer population problem, especially if hunting is as 
ineffective as Adler argues.  
Rats, unlike prairie dogs or deer, are vermin that are present in all societies.  They 
are problems for urbanites, suburbanites and rural communities.  Rural communities have 
problems with rats, as well as mice, because they tend to inhabit places that enable them 
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to easily access human buildings, barns, houses, and silos to name a few.  In urban and 
suburban places, rats tend to live in sewers or places that are congenial to the rat-life-
style, which are normally out of view of humans. Like any animal, rats would rather have 
a safe, warm place where food is readily available then a cold, wet, hostile environment 
in which food may not be easy to find.  In turn, rats have probably been living in and/or 
around human settlements since the first civilizations.  They have adapted to live in close 
proximity to people and rely on humans for their life-styles because humans, in creating a 
place for humans to live, have produced waste to eat and areas congenial to the rat-life-
style. Because rats live in cohabitation with humans (a more intimate relationship than 
invasive species) and they have nasty behaviors that humans find annoying or 
troublesome, they are candidates for vermin-hood. A pamphlet released by the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare states, “Rats in the human environment 
cause enormous economic losses.  They consume or contaminate vast quantities of food 
and feed, and they destroy other property, as when they cause fires by gnawing the 
insulation of electric wires.”  It continues, “Each rat damages between $1 and $10 worth 
of food and other materials per year by gnawing and feeding, and contaminates 5 to 10 
times mores.  Thus, rats may cost the United States between $500,000,000 and 
1,000,000,000 annually in terms of direct economic losses.” (Ibid., 1)  The losses, in this 
case, are economic not ecological, and are extremely impacting on the United States.   
Perhaps prairie dogs and rats are a poor example because they hardly elicit an 
emotional response from most readers, yet, sympathy for the animals is not my 
objective.  The objective here is to outline the problems with DV. Unlike invasive 
species, which are introduced to an ecosystem, DV do not have to be invasive.  DV can 
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be destructive in their natural habitat, albeit one that has been altered by humans, and 
they can cause enormous amounts of destruction in human societies. The point of this 
section is to establish the ways in which an animal can be thought of as a DV.  We now 
turn to HV, health risk vermin.  
People have a seemingly irrational fear of mice, yet people tend to think that mice 
are cute creating a strange dichotomy.  As Bill Adler articulates, “Consider the fact that 
in books and cartoons, mice are celebrated:  There’s Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, and 
Mighty Mouse and other pint-sized squeaky heroes.  When it’s cat-versus-mouse in the 
cartoons, the mouse is always the good guy.” (Ibid., 147) At the same time, a sitcom 
character mentions a mouse and the token-wife will jump onto a chair and refuse to get 
down until it is apprehended or eradicated.  Although, mice, like rats, cause a 
considerable amount of economic damage, this fanatical response, which occasionally 
seems exaggerated in the media until experienced first hand, is irrational until we look at 
the health risks associated with mice and rats.  
Mice and, particularly, rats are feared because of the health risks.  The most 
famous type of disease that is carried by rats is the plague.  Although there hasn’t been an 
outbreak of plague in the United States since 1924, it is possible for any rat to contract 
the bubonic plague.  As most people are aware, plague is not caused by rats, but by lice 
that rats carry.  In fact, lice that are not carriers of plague are relatively harmless.  
Moreover, plague is a bacterium that lice carry that rats become infected with, causing us 
to place the blame of plague on rats.  For our purposes identifying rats as the plague 
carriers is useful because if we eliminate rats, then we can eliminate plague.   
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There are problems with this causal story.  Alan Garfinkel argues in “The Ethics 
of Explanation” that when one identifies a cause it is inherently value laden.  He makes 
the case that cause-identifiers attempt to identify a cause they can control, but that, in 
fact, they really identify a cause that minimizes their responsibility to the situation: 
In certain cases the principle “Select as the cause those things over which 
you have control” is replaced by “Minimize you own role in all this by 
selecting as the cause those things over which you do not have control.  
The standard accounts of causal selection do not acknowledge this 
inversion of practicality.  But it is clear enough that it happens. (Ibid, 278) 
  
He continues to lambaste causal explanations by acknowledging that identifying a 
cause is really only identifying a partial cause: 
Consequently, if the “scientific” premise, the statement “A causes B” is a 
statement of partial causality and cites only some of the causal factors, the 
whole syllogism will suffer.  In such a case, drawing the conclusion 
“avoid A” from the premises “A causes B” and “B is undesirable” is 
simply fallacious. (Ibid., 279) 
  
Because it is practical and useful to identify rats as the carries of plagues, we are able to 
justify their extermination and neglect our role in creating/harboring vermin.  Our blame 
of vermin, particularly rats, is a misplaced causal story, as the example above shows.  
However, given that our causal explanation is only partial and that it fails to acknowledge 
our responsibility in creating congenial atmospheres for plague carrying vermin, it is true 
that it is probably near impossible to eliminate lice from rats without eliminating the rats.  
Yet, this objection misses the point.  We probably cannot eliminate the lice, or the 
disease, but we can employ different methods of containing rats other than extermination.  
A logical extension of this causal story, however, will show that there is a 
problem in misplacing disease causality.  For example, in the 1980’s it was the case that 
homosexuals and drug-addicts were more likely to contract the HIV/AIDs than non-
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homosexuals and non-needle-using drug users.  At that point in our society, snide 
remarks were made about exterminating homosexuals and drug-addicts like vermin to 
stop the spread of the disease because we were able to identify the cause of HIV/AID as 
‘partaking in deviant behavior.’  (NB: the slang use of vermin has been applied to people 
who are ‘parasites on society’ or something of that sort.)  Furthermore, if, as a society, we 
had deemed it appropriate to exterminate homosexuals and needle-using drug addicts 
because of their proneness to contract HIV/AIDs, like we have exterminated rats, it may 
have been possible to stop the spread of AIDs (in America) before the AIDs epidemic of 
the 1990’s began, but I highly doubt it and this approach that seems ethically wrong. A 
critical reader will aptly point out that this argument is a bit of a red-herring: there are 
other diseases that rats carry that are problematic for humans, and that logical extension 
to humans, especially to humans who choose a certain life-style whereas rats do not 
choose, is not accurate.  The second objection may have an element of truth, but the 
purpose is to show that there could be alternative ways to stopping or curtailing a disease 
or potential epidemic without having to eliminate the individuals. If we had identified the 
cause of HIV/AIDs as unsafe drug and sexual behavior, instead of labeling and 
identifying the cause as a deviant lifestyle, we probably would have been able to curtail 
the explosion of HIV/AIDs in the 1990’s which has not been contained to those ‘deviant 
lifestyles’. 
The first objection to this example, that there are other diseases carried by rats, is 
absolutely true: rat-bite fever, leptospirosis, salmonellosis, trichinosis, murine typhus 
fever, rickettsialpox, and others are all diseases carried by rats.  Most of these diseases 
are non-fatal, easily treatable, and carried by other animals that we are in continual 
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contact with.  While there are these many diseases that rats carry, it does not follow that 
the only method for preventing disease is extermination, especially since many of these 
diseases are easily treated.  Additionally, extermination may be the cheapest, but it may 
not be the most efficacious, which will be discussed in the next section. To conclude, 
there are many HV’s, rats being one among many, and there are many ways of preventing 
the spread of these diseases, but extermination is not the only means of prevention.  
While there are rationalizations for exterminating vermin, it seems that extermination is a 
cheap and lazy way of dealing with the problem.  Extermination and other means of 
prevention will be discussed in the next section. 
  
Alternative Methods of Prevention 
  
            The U.S. department of Health, Education, and Welfare published a manual in the 
late 1960’s citing numerous ways of dealing with rats and mice (rats and mice are not the 
only vermin, but they are the easiest to discuss and it is my hope that in discussing the 
most well-known, most feared, and the prevention methods, one could easily apply these 
or similar methods in dealing with other vermin). The manual contains an extensive 
section on the different types of poisons and exterminating procedures one could employ 
to exterminate vermin, but a considerable portion of the manual discusses ways to make 
homes, buildings, and farms inhospitable to vermin.  Another smart book on ways to 
curtail vermin of all kinds is Adler’s Outwitting Critters, mentioned above.  
            To limit vermin there are three main elements: the physical environment, 
predation, and competition.  “The physical environment is comprised of three main 
elements: food and water, harborage, and climate…[however] man can reduce rodent 
populations and keep them low by permanently eliminating their food, water, and 
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harborage.” (1970, 9)  It should be obvious to any reader, that if we eliminate those 
things that vermin need, then we eliminate the vermin and thus the destruction and health 
risks they carry, without having to exterminate them.  One could easily limit the food 
supply forcing vermin out of human homes by properly storing and disposing of refuse.  
This would entail keeping waste and usable food 12 to 18 inches off the ground in bins 
that lock or are impermeable to rats, compacting and covering landfills daily (what are 
called ‘sanitary landfills’), blocking possible entrances to houses/farms, and using a 
garbage disposal in sinks only when necessary so as to reduce sewer rats.  If rats and 
mice are already a problem in a house, Adler suggests using ultrasonic devices that create 
sonic stress for rodents, making your home inhospitable to them.  He says, “there are 
many on the market, and manufacturers of most of them claim the gadgets will drive the 
animals from your home.” (Ibid, 160)  He lists several problems with these devices, but 
also lists technological advances that remedy those problems.   
            These are viable methods for reducing vermin, which in turn, reduces health risks 
and destruction.  These methods are preferable to extermination in most cases.  The only 
case where extermination may be plausible would be one in which the animals in 
question have completely overrun an area of a building rendering it inhabitable and non-
salvageable. Even then, it may be possible to destroy the building while employing some 
method of making the land inhospitable to vermin. Additionally, the ways in which we 
use poisons and rodenticides are often problematic.  The rodent control manual states, 
“Controlling rat populations, not individual rats, is the key to a successful rodent-control 
program in a community.” (1970, 9)  This would mean that it would take sizeable 
amounts of poisons or rodenticides to eliminate a rat population.  This would be 
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potentially dangerous for other animals that we care about: cats, dogs, and small children 
to name a few. Not only that, in employing exterminating programs, we potentially 
introduce toxins into our own waterways and food sources.   In essence, the easiest way, 
extermination, creates problem for other animals including humans, and individual traps 
do not help reduce the vermin population to any significant degree. To conclude, the 
jump from identifying a vermin to exterminating a vermin is an easy way out, but in the 
long run will create more problems and not necessarily fix the problem.   
            An example from Time magazine illustrates this problem.  In Mammoth Lakes, 
CA, a small ski-resort town, restaurant owners began leaving their dumpsters open so 
tourists would be able to see real, live, wild black bears.  What the people of Mammoth 
Lakes did not initially realize was that if you create a hospitable atmosphere for any 
animal cum vermin, they will stay.  The black bears settled into abandoned homes and 
began having cubs and soon the town was overrun with black bear.  The normal response 
to such situations, as per Rocky Mountain National Park, is to kill any bear that has 
tasted human food because if they have tasted it once they will come back for more and 
they are a potential threat to campers, hikers, and mountain enthusiasts.   But instead of 
disposing of the bears in the normal, extremist way, the town contracted Steve Searles, a 
local resident, to rid the town without severely injuring or doing harm to the bears.  
Searles spent a year observing the bears in their new habitat and then formulated a plan. 
His plan was to mix dominance, territorial marking and the animals’ fear 
of confrontation to become, he explained to officials, the city’s “baddest 
bear.”  Soon he began chasing bears from basements and out of school 
yards with rubber bullets, pepper spray and pistol-loaded screamer 
rockets.  He shouted threats so each bear remembered him.  After a bear 
left a house, Searles marked the den as off limits by sprinkling it with his 
own urine.  (1998) 
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Not too surprisingly, this method worked.  By learning about how the bears 
operated, Searles was able to significantly reduce the bear population, by making 
the town less hospitable to them.   
  
Metaphysical Implications 
  
            As I hope to have shown, vermin is a term that is used vaguely by most people 
and one of the most common responses is to call an exterminator, which is usually the 
result of poor rationalizing and laziness. In addition, I have shown that there are ways of 
thinking about different types of vermin – DV/HV distinction.  I have also implicitly 
discussed the causes of vermin – poor maintenance of surrounding areas creating 
hospitable living and breeding zones, over population, the elimination of predators, and 
others.  I have shown that all the causes of vermin stem from human interference or 
disturbance of a ‘natural’ state. We have named an entire class of animals that qualify as 
vermin, and have created cordial places for them to live. What I mean, is that outside of 
human society/civilization there is not an animal that is vermin.  Unlike horses, which 
would still exist as horses regardless of humans, albeit slightly different from breeding, 
there exists, independently of the human name for them, some sort of animal that has a 
life, which we call ‘horse’.  There is no animal that is ‘vermin.’  In turn, vermin is a non-
natural category of animals.   
In discussing natural versus non-natural, I defined ‘non-natural’ in the following 
way: a non-natural state is one in which it could not have arisen without human or some 
sort of intelligent being interfering in some way.  A holistic objection, roughly sketched 
above, would be that everything is natural, including human interference, thus everything 
would have to be non-natural.  A theological objection would be that some sort of 
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intelligent being created everything.  Neither of these objections is detrimental to this 
discussion.  In the former, this holist ignores the way in which I am limiting natural, and 
although this may not be fair to a holist, there is probably not any other way in discussing 
the problem of vermin seriously.  It may be the case that there is nothing that now lives 
outside the realm of human interference, but we can imagine untainted ecosystems or a 
world in which humans had not interfered and this is what I name ‘natural.’  In response 
to the theological objection, I cannot respond on such terms because it is not founded on 
empirical data and conflates the meaning of ‘intelligent being’, thus I dismiss it.  
Annabelle Sabloff in her book Reordering the Natural World would object that 
there is nature inside the places that I have defined as non-natural, which at first glance 
seems to negate my position.  She states, “Urban life is inimical to nature, people would 
say sadly, or angrily, or with resignation. Yet nature, almost universally defined by my 
respondents as nonhuman living beings, is in fact everywhere woven into the fabric of the 
city.” (Ibid, 5)  I believe she is entirely correct – nature is found everywhere, and there is 
a biotic community in every space on earth – but this does not negate my stance.  While 
there is nature, a biotic community of some sort in every space, it does not follow that 
cities and places that people do not think of as nature are natural, as I defined it.  The way 
in which Sabloff uses ‘nature’ is in a more holistic sense, while the way that I’m using 
natural and non-natural depends on human influence. 
In creating a non-natural category of animal called vermin, and creating a way for 
them to live, humans have systemically created a faction of living creatures that does not 
have a natural ontological status.  That is, there is no place in the ‘natural world’, outside 
the realm of human interference, in which there exists something that is a true vermin 
Between the Species VI August 2006 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 22
(note: vermin is different from parasite).  I assume that because vermin do not have a 
natural ontological status, we have been able to deny that they have value: when one 
spots a deer in its natural setting one is awed by its splendid and ‘inherent’ beauty.  But 
when one spots a herd of deer eating one’s garden, one is able to ignore their splendor 
and beauty and replace it with annoyance and vermin status; in turn, it becomes 
permissible to not only place a fence around the garden (deny their right to forage for 
food, which seems a tolerable action), but to justify hunting and killing them because 
they are a nuisance or over-populated.   
In creating a faction of animals that we attribute a non-natural ontological status 
coupled with the idea that animals are outside the realm of moral consideration, we deny 
that we have any responsibility to them.  This creates ethical issues that will be addressed 
in the next section.  
  
Ethical Problems with Vermin 
  
Including Vermin 
  
            Tom Reagan, Bernard Rollin, Peter Singer and many others have argued for the 
admission of animals into the realm of moral consideration.  Unlike Singer and Reagan, 
Rollin argues that humans ought to take into consideration the telos of the animals when 
we use them for our purposes.  That is, we ought to consider what their ‘natural’ 
inclinations, predispositions and tendencies are, in how we treat/use them.  He makes the 
argument that our belief structure already allows that animals deserve moral 
consideration and that excluding them from the realm of moral consideration is logically 
inconsistent.  He states, 
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 I cannot force my ideal, however, polished and articulate on you.  I can, 
however, attempt to show you that you are already committed to that ideal 
by virtue of certain assumptions you already hold, and thereby show you 
that the ideal I am pressing upon you is in fact a consequence of beliefs 
you yourself entertain.  (Ibid, 25) 
  
 However, Rollin and others have focused mainly on research animals and animals used 
in research.  Many others have discussed invasive species or other unwanted animals, 
including unwanted pets.  Our topic, vermin, has been largely ignored for various 
reasons.  Chiefly, vermin is a colloquial word that has been replaced by other, more 
technical terms that are admissible to the philosophical or scientific disciplines, such as 
invasive species.  Yet, the words that have been used in these traditions do not connote 
the same as vermin, which I have shown.  However, the arguments put forth by Rollin 
and others have allowed a forum for a serious discussion about vermin by showing that 
animals, even unwanted, ugly, annoying, and problematic animals, deserve moral 
consideration.  I have shown that there is the issue of misappropriated causality, a 
culturally dislike of vermin that may not be soundly reasoned (see next paragraph), and a 
non-natural ontological status all of which enable an extremist attitude (i.e. 
extermination) in dealing with vermin when there are suitable and practical preventative 
measures. Furthermore, taking the extremist stance is logically inconsistent with the 
general social attitude towards animals.  
            We have neglected to include vermin as animals that deserve moral consideration 
because the rationalizations seem well considered, but for the most part, are poorly 
misinformed and/or reasoned. The purpose is not to advocate living harmoniously with 
animals that can cause terrible economic and ecological destruction and health problems.  
Rather, I advocate looking at the way in which we treat vermin and possible alternatives 
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that are logically consistent with the ethical values we hold about animals. After all, pets, 
which we love dearly and consider members of the family, are prone to diseases and 
destruction, but we do not and ought not destroy them when they become sick.  The 
question becomes, ought we include vermin in the realm of moral consideration?  This 
question has already been implicitly answered affirmatively.  Rollin also argues that 
animals we have used and or created for our purposes (lab rats, research animals, and 
agricultural animals) deserve moral consideration in virtue of the fact that they are 
contingent on our systems of breeding and living – or what I have dubbed non-natural 
ontological status. This holds true for vermin. The question then becomes: since we have 
created them, do we have responsibility to their telos?  Again, the answer is 
confirmatory.  This suggests we ought to find either new alternative means for the vermin 
problem or employ the alternative approaches I have outlines in the section entitled 
‘Alternative Methods of Prevention’ 
  
Another Route – Conclusion 
  
            I realize that many people have a visceral reaction against vermin and that this 
paper may seem too radical, and thus this paper may have fallen on deaf ears. I have tried 
to articulate that vermin can be dangerous if given the opportunity, but the way in which 
we deal with vermin, by excluding them from the realm of moral consideration through a 
misinformed rationalization process and immediately employing the last-resort by calling 
the exterminator, is inconsistent with the ethical consideration we have begun to delegate 
to other animals.  After all, if we should exterminate all potentially dangerous animals, 
like vermin, we can extend it to other animals. The last part of this essay will hopefully 
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resonate with those people who feel I am being too radical when it comes to the problems 
of vermin.   
If we do not feel as though we should include vermin because the rationalized 
reasons provide enough of a basis for extermination, then it follows that we can logically 
extend the criteria of animal-vermin to human-vermin.  This means that the slang use of 
vermin applied to humans must be entertained seriously.   
What types of people can qualify as vermin?  Because vermin is vaguely defined, 
even though it has been refined for this paper, it can be widely applied.  A vermin can be 
destructive in an economic and ecological way, but can also be a health risk.  When this 
criteria is applied to humans, vermin-hood is applied on a culturally sensitive basis: for 
the Jews of Israel the Palestinians and vermin, for the Palestinians and the Arab Nation 
the Jews are vermin, for American pre-civil rights era blacks and minorities, for the 
established families in the newly established United States of America, circa 1820, the 
Irish, and for contemporary Americans the most likely candidate is the homeless.   
The homeless are perfect candidates for vermin-hood because they are a drain on 
our economy and pose health risks, not only to themselves but also to others who are 
daring enough to walk within close proximity.  Additionally, homelessness is a good 
topic for discussion and argument from analogy, because homelessness is worldwide 
problem, which makes it less culturally sensitive than targeting Jews or blacks.  Most 
Americans do not treat the homeless like vermin - in many cases we treat them better 
than vermin.  We have shelters and rehabilitation programs and most importantly we do 
not advocate exterminating them.  Ought we?   It would seem that if we have no quarrels 
with exterminating animal-vermin then we should not have any problem exterminating 
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human-vermin because they fit all the criteria.  The only difference is that they are 
human, and thus in the realm of moral consideration.  But if we must extend moral 
consideration to animals because the rationalizations for keeping them separate are 
unconvincing to a well-informed, well-reasoning person, then we must extend moral 
consideration to vermin.  If this is not suitable, then we must extend vermin-hood to 
humans, specifically it ought not seem morally abhorrent to exterminate the homeless.   
Exterminating the homeless is morally abhorrent and this is why we have 
alternative means for prevention and rehabilitation.  It follows that we should be willing 
to find alternative methods for dealing with vermin!  There are three potential underlying 
problems – there is a problem with exterminating vermin, there is a problem with not 
exterminating those that fit criteria of vermin, or there is a problem with the logical 
extension from humans to animals and animals to humans.   I cannot formulate a good 
argument against the logical extension from humans to animals and thus I cannot 
formulate a good argument from animals to humans, unless one is willing to say that 
humans are fundamentally different from animals, which negates extending morals 
consideration to animals, which has been roundly rejected by many.  I cannot retain a 
good consciousness by advocating that we should treat some humans, those who fit the 
criteria, as expendable.  The only reasonable thing to say is that there is a better, more 
logically and ethically consistent way of treating those animals we have christened 
vermin.  
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